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THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
Cornerstone of a New International Norm
Commander Joel A. Doolin, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile tech-nology,” are the means by which “small groups could attain a catastrophic
power to strike great nations.”1 Preventing terrorists from obtaining such weap-
ons of mass destruction (WMD) has inspired a dramatic shift in U.S. strategy,
from deterrence to preemption: “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt
his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”2 The legal hurdles
in the path of a preemptive strategy, however, were revealed by the So San inci-
dent of December 2002.
THE SO SAN INCIDENT AND THE PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE
In late 2002 U.S. intelligence had collected evidence of money transfers from Ye-
men to North Korea. Satellite footage showed Scud fuel oxidizer being loaded
into shipping containers. Analysts narrowed identification of the merchant ves-
sel carrying the Scuds themselves to one of “three likely ships,” including the
North Korean–flagged So San. That vessel was pinpointed because of two ac-
tions that might seem innocuous in themselves but
were suspicious if taken together. First, it zigzagged;
merchant vessels ordinarily follow a steady course on
the rhumb line, the shortest track between two points
on the globe. Second, the crew of So San lowered and
raised the vessel’s flag; this is unusual, because the na-
tional ensign must be displayed continuously while
under way.3
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Surveillance of the ship in international waters of the Indian Ocean produced
a legal basis for boarding—the fact that “So San” was freshly painted on the
stern, the customary location for a ship’s name, whereas no vessel of that name
was registered under the North Korean flag. That made the vessel “stateless” un-
der international law, permitting U.S. warships to invoke a peacetime right to
approach and visit.4 The master of the vessel declined to give consent for board-
ing and ignored warning shots; special operations forces rappelled aboard by
helicopter to stop and search the vessel. The master claimed his cargo was ce-
ment, but the boarding team discovered fifteen Scud missiles.5 Dialogue be-
tween the United States and Yemen followed, fueling speculation that political
considerations would reverse the interdiction: Yemen was a prospective partner
in the war on terror, and escalation of tension with a nuclear-capable North Ko-
rea was to be avoided. Indeed, So San was allowed to proceed.
The situation is frustrating in operational terms. The U.S.-led maritime-
interdiction coalition had mastered the factors of time, space, and force; prompt
intelligence had correctly identified a Scud carrier; warships had intercepted be-
fore it could deliver its cargo and had apprehended it with sufficient force. Yet
there was no gain—the Scuds were permitted to arrive at their destination, due
to the lack of legal power to seize them. Or was it the political will to argue there
was, or should be, legal justification for seizure that was lacking? In the event,
operational success, international law, and politics could not be synchronized,
and so the interdiction failed.
Legal debate on the incident begins with the premise that proper authority in
two respects must be present if maritime interdiction is to be effective. First, there
must be authority to visit and search a particular vessel. This was satisfied in the So
San case by its status as “stateless.”Second, there must be authority to seize, detain,
or divert cargo found aboard. This did not exist here.6 Conventional missiles are
not contraband subject to seizure. No United Nations resolution imposes a weap-
ons embargo against Yemen. Neither North Korea nor Yemen are signatories to
the Missile Technology Control Regime, which might have authorized seizure.7
Accordingly, there was no unquestionable legal authority to seize the Scuds.
The So San case illustrates the close intertwining of politics and international
law. Less than a month before, the United Nations Security Council had passed
Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its disarma-
ment obligations.”8 The decade-old embargo against Iraq was not used as au-
thority to board So San, because its destination was clearly Yemen. Though USS
Cole (DDG 67) had been in Aden, Yemen, when it was attacked two years earlier,
the United States did not now make a self-defense claim. Arguments for seizing
Yemeni ballistic missiles would have divided international political opinion on
weapons of mass destruction precisely when solidarity was desired for a future
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resolution authorizing “all necessary measures” to dismantle Iraqi programs. The
price of solidarity was allowing Yemen to keep the Scuds and declining the oppor-
tunity to use So San as a precedent for interdiction of WMD on the high seas.
Five months later, the United States started to close the gap in international
law through which So San had sailed. On 31 May 2003, President Bush launched
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) at a G-8 summit in Krakow, Poland.
PSI “builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation”
of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, “their delivery systems, and related
materials worldwide.”9
Over time, PSI will make seizure of weapons of mass destruction at sea an in-
ternational norm. This article examines that component of PSI, in particular the
inherent operational and legal issues.10 The operational factors of space, time,
and force create strengths and weaknesses for WMD-interdiction operations;
similarly, legal provisions relevant to WMD interdiction offer both utility and
limitations. Analysis and supporting tables set forth legal options created by
customary international law and treaty for interdiction at sea. The article offers
specific recommendations to enhance operations, based upon what is legally
feasible, with a focus on source countries and drug trafficking. The article then
briefly discusses the advantages and challenges of using NATO architecture and
combined exercises and deployments, as well as improved intelligence sharing
among PSI participants, at the interagency and international levels.
THE FEW, THE RICH: THE PSI CORE MEMBERS
The United States and fifteen other nations are core members of PSI and partici-
pate in regularly scheduled meetings.11 In September 2003, participating nations
issued a “Statement of Interdiction Principles,” which call for the use of diplo-
matic, information, and military instruments of power. “More than sixty coun-
tries have signaled that they support PSI and are ready to participate in
interdiction efforts.”12
PSI appeals to the common interest of states to support counterproliferation:
secure borders uninterrupted by the catastrophic consequences of a WMD at-
tack, with its human suffering and economic chaos. This is a strong mutual in-
terest among the sixteen core members, which also have in common wealth,
previous interest in counterproliferation, and existing security arrangements
with the United States.
As table 1 shows, nine of the sixteen core members are G-8 or G-8/G-20* coun-
tries. All PSI core participants are signatories to the Biological Weapons
D O O L I N 3 1
* The G-20, or Group of Twenty, established on 20 August 2003, focuses on agriculture. The members
are developing countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Ven-
ezuela, and Zimbabwe. See G-20, www.g-20.mre.gov.br/index.asp.
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Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Fifteen of the sixteen are also signatories to four
other international agreements against WMD: the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)*, the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment (WA), and the Zangger Committee (ZC).13 Thirteen of the sixteen PSI core
members are also NATO members. Two others, Australia and Japan, have bilateral
security treaties with the United States. The sixteenth, Singapore, has cordial mili-
tary relations with the United States and is strengthening them.14 These criteria
constitute a potential formula for recruiting future PSI participants.
Table 2 identifies fourteen countries that support all seven WMD agreements
but are not PSI core members. Ten more subscribe to at least four agreements,
3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* NSG, founded in 1974, is a forty-nation group that controls exports of nuclear weapons and nuclear-
related items. WA, comprising thirty-three nations and founded in 1996, deals with the export of
conventional armaments and dual-use technologies. ZC, with thirty-five nations, concentrates on
aligning the Non-Proliferation Treaty with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) export
standards.
G-8/G-20 NATO NSG ZC MTCR WA REMARKS
Australia G-20 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1
Canada G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
France G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2
Germany G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Italy G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Japan G-8/G-20 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Norway Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Portugal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Singapore No Yes Yes No Yes 4
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turkey G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
United Kingdom G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
United States G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TABLE 1
PSI CORE MEMBERSHIP PROFILE
NPT = Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty BWC = Biological Weapons Convention
NSG = Nuclear Suppliers Group ZC = Zangger Committee
MTCR = Missile Technology Control Regime CWC = Chemical Weapons Convention
WA = Wassenaar Arrangement
Remarks:
1. Australia and the United States have a bilateral security treaty.
2. France is a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty but not a member of NATO.
3. Japan and the United States have a bilateral security treaty.
4. Singapore is a host for U.S. military forces.
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D O O L I N 3 3
MTCR BWC CWC NPT NSG ZC WA NATO/PfP
Argentina • • • • • • •
Australia • • • • • • •
Austria • • • • • • • PfP
Belarus • • • PfP
Belgium • • • • • • • NATO
Brazil • • • • •
Bulgaria • • • • • NATO
Canada • • • • • • • NATO
China • • • •
Cyprus • • •
Czech Rep • • • • • • • NATO
Denmark • • • • • • • NATO
Finland • • • • • • • PfP
France • • • • • • • NATO
Germany • • • • • • • NATO
Greece • • • • • • • NATO
Hungary • • • • • • • NATO
Iceland • • • • NATO
Ireland • • • • • • • PfP
Italy • • • • • • • NATO
Japan • • • • • • •
Kazakhstan • • • PfP
Latvia • • • • NATO
Luxembourg • • • • • • • NATO
Netherlands • • • • • • • NATO
New Zealand • • • • •
Norway • • • • • • • NATO
Philippines • • •
Poland • • • • • • • NATO
Portugal • • • • • • • NATO
Romania • • • • • • NATO
Russia • • • • • • • PfP
Singapore • • •
Slovakia • • • • • • NATO
Slovenia • • • • • NATO
South Africa • • • • • •
South Korea • • • • • • •
Spain • • • • • • • NATO
Sweden • • • • • • • PfP
Switzerland • • • • • • • PfP
Turkey • • • • • • • NATO
Ukraine • • • • • • • PfP
United Kingdom • • • • • • • NATO
United States • • • • • • • NATO
[3] [167] [180] [187] [40] [35] [33] [26/20]
TABLE 2
MEMBERSHIP OF MAJOR WMD CONVENTIONS
Notes: Figures in brackets are the number of participants in each convention. PSI Core Members are italicized. Fourteen countries are signatories
to all seven WMD agreements but are not yet in the PSI core: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Luxembourg, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine.
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including NPT, CWC, and BWC.15 Russia is the only G-8 member that is not a
core PSI member, and it is a signatory to all seven WMD agreements. Argentina,
South Africa, and South Korea are G-20 countries that support at least six WMD
agreements and have good or improving security ties with the United States.16
Other G-20 members not in the PSI core are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mex-
ico, and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has the same characteristics as core member
Singapore: military ties with the United States and signatory status for the three
main WMD conventions. PSI nations account for 50 percent of NATO’s members.
Five NATO members and seven Partnership for Peace members (PfP) support all
seven major WMD conventions but are not yet in the PSI core.17
Table 3 depicts the supermajority of United Nations members that support
three major WMD conventions outlawing nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. PSI builds upon this enormous political consensus. The next section
argues that all PSI participants, core and noncore members alike, can use their
collective sovereignty to achieve counterproliferation objectives.
HOW SOVEREIGNTY POWERS THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY
INITIATIVE
Every nation that participates in PSI will apply resources of territory, airspace,
waters, and laws to the coalition objective of nonproliferation. PSI interlinks the
sovereign powers of many states by asking participants to follow four interdic-
tion principles (the “PSI Principles”).
• Interdict “chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, their delivery systems
and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern.”18
• Streamline procedures for the “rapid exchange of relevant information”
concerning WMD proliferation.19
• Strengthen national legal authorities to accomplish the two objectives
above.
• Prevent the transport of WMD within geographic areas and by vessels
subject to their jurisdiction, by taking specific actions consistent with both
their national and international laws.20
Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zones. The PSI Principles further call on par-
ticipants to take the following specific actions: refrain from transporting weap-
ons of mass destruction; require vessels to undergo inspections as a condition of
entry and departure; stop and search vessels that are reasonably suspected of
carrying WMD cargoes at their ports, in internal waters, in territorial seas, and
in contiguous zones; and seize WMD cargoes found.21
3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Under international law, a nation’s sovereignty extends seaward twelve nauti-
cal miles from its baseline, forming a belt called the state’s “territorial sea.”22 In
its territorial sea a nation enjoys law enforcement rights identical to those that it
exercises on land within its borders. Ships “enjoy the right of innocent passage
for the continuous and expeditious traversing” of a foreign territorial sea, but
this right is not absolute.23 The coastal nation may “take affirmative actions in its
territorial sea to prevent passage that is not innocent, including, if necessary, the
use of force.”24 The vessel conducting innocent passage is subject not only to the
laws of the coastal nation but to the enforcement of those laws.25 Accordingly,
the coastal nation can approach, visit, and search any vessel in its territorial sea.
The next twelve miles can be declared by the coastal nation as a “contiguous
zone,” where the state is permitted to exercise its customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitary laws.26 Weapons of mass destruction are by definition dangerous
materials, transportation of which must be consistent with customs laws. Thus,
D O O L I N 3 5
Yeara Convention Participantsb Coverage
1968 NPT 187/191
Prohibits transfer of nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, and items
that would assist in the manufacture of nuclear weapons (NPT Art. 1)
1972 BWC 167/191
Prohibits microbial or other biological agents, or toxins and weapons, equip-
ment or means of delivery (BWC Art. 1)
1974 NSG 040/191
Controls export of nuclear materials and equipment, including technologies
applicable to peaceful uses, without International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards
1974 ZC 035/191
Harmonizes NPT with IAEA export requirements for special fissionable ma-
terial and equipment for processing, use, or production of special fissionable
material
1987 MTCR 033/191
Controls export of 300 km–range missiles capable of carrying a WMD pay-
load and their essential technologies (MTCR)
1993 CWC 180/191
Prohibits a total of 19 chemicals and 28 precursors (CWC Schedules):
• Eight highly toxic chemicals and four precursors
• Three lethal chemicals and eleven precursors
• Four toxic commercial chemicals and thirteen precursors
• Three unscheduled discrete organic chemicals (phosphorus, sulfur, and
fluorine)
1996 WA 033/191
Prevents destabilizing accumulations of seven types of conventional weapons,
including missiles and missile systems, and three tiers of goods and
technologies
2004
UNSCRc
1540
Criminalizes the proliferation of WMD and delivery systems to nonstate ac-
tors and for terrorist purposes
TABLE 3
CONVENTIONS AGAINST WMD
Notes:
a. Agreement reached and signatures begun.
b. Signatories and parties to the convention, regardless of ratification status, over the total United Nations (UN) membership (since 24 April 2003 there have
been 191 members).
c. UN Security Council Resolution.
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every nation has the authority to prevent illegal WMD “imports” by enforcing
its customs laws within twenty-four nautical miles of its coast. PSI leverages this
national sovereignty to accomplish nonproliferation objectives.
Consent of the Flag Nation. The PSI Principles invoke national jurisdiction and
authority over vessels flagged by that country, regardless of location. Partici-
pants agree to board and search any vessel flying their flags “beyond the territo-
rial seas of any state,”either based upon a reasonable suspicion the vessel is carrying
WMD “or at the request and good cause shown by another state”;27 to “seriously
consider providing consent” for other states to board and search vessels flying their
flag;28 and to seize WMD cargoes found pursuant to the two tasks above.
Nationality provides the legal basis for “same flag” boardings and for obtain-
ing consent from flag nations to search their vessels in international waters. As
codified by Articles 92 and 110 of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
vention (UNCLOS*), warships and military aircraft have the peacetime right to
approach and visit in international waters vessels of the “same nationality as the
warship” or aircraft.29 PSI participants also bring the sovereign power to autho-
rize inspection by other countries of vessels flying their flags in international
waters. The commercial fleets of six PSI core members are among the world’s fif-
teen largest, accounting for 12 percent of all merchant vessels.30 Significantly,
however, current PSI participants all together own only a fraction of the world’s
merchant vessels.
Bilateral agreements under the PSI rubric between nations can produce rapid
flag-nation consent for searches. Numerous bilateral agreements enable consent
boardings in support of counternarcotics interdiction. Recently, the United States
used this type of agreement as the model for the first bilateral agreements facilitat-
ing consent for WMD interdiction. Bilateral agreements between the United
States and the flag nations of the two largest merchant fleets, Panama and Liberia,
can in a matter of hours authorize boardings of suspect vessels by U.S. personnel
in international waters to search for WMD cargoes. These bilateral agreements
and others with Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, and the Marshall Islands raise the per-
centage of vessels accessible to consent boardings by PSI nations to well over half.31
The Air Picture. The PSI Principles ask participating nations to deny aircraft en-
try into their airspace or require transiting aircraft to land for inspection if there
is a reasonable suspicion that their cargo includes weapons of mass destruction.32
These procedures are consistent with existing international law, under which
national airspace extends seaward twelve nautical miles from the country’s
3 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* So known, as a collective shorthand, for the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or
UNCLOS III, 1973–82, at which the legal instruments were negotiated, formulated, and issued for
signature.
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baseline.33 On the ground, nonmilitary aircraft of any nationality can be
searched by the host nation.34 States also have the right to refuse entry of foreign
aircraft into their national airspace, unless that airspace is also an international
strait or the state is party to an international agreement to the contrary.35
The Peacetime Right of Approach and Visit. Vessels in international waters are
generally immune from the jurisdiction of other nations. Stopping a vessel at sea
means interfering with its fundamental right of freedom of navigation. War-
ships have the unique power to abridge free navigation by legally approaching
and visiting vessels. During such an “approach and visit” the vessel’s master may
consent to a search, but even a brief delay costs merchants time, inconvenience,
and money. The extent of a warship’s power to “approach and visit,” then, de-
pends on the situation.
In peacetime, the presumption is in favor of free navigation. As codified by
the UNCLOS, warships may impede it only if there are reasonable grounds to
suspect a vessel is engaged in one of six categories of illegal activity: piracy, slave
trade, unauthorized broadcasting, operation without nationality, deception re-
garding nationality (if the vessel is actually of the same nationality as the war-
ship), and illegal narcotics trafficking.36
It is important to emphasize, with regard to operational planning, that the
illegal-activity exceptions cannot be employed against the vast majority of le-
gally registered vessels. Facts and circumstances will arise where an exception
can be invoked, but only against particular vessels, not the entire fleet of that
country. Under current international law, there is no authority to stop vessels on
the high seas solely because of what they are suspected of transporting.
Authority to Seize WMD. The PSI Principles, however, presume that weapons of
mass destruction are subject to seizure. This presumption is based on the reality,
reflected in table 3, that the overwhelming majority of nations have signed trea-
ties outlawing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
The United Nations has 191 member states. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been accepted by over 188 of them, nearly the
entire UN membership.37 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has been
signed by 180 nations. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
has been accepted by 176 nations, over 87 percent of the UN membership.
Normally, a treaty binds only nations that agree to it. However, the doctrine
of customary international law holds that a well established and widespread
practice is evidence of the existence of a duty binding on all nations.38 Accord-
ingly, the NPT, CWC, and BWC are arguably enforceable against nonsigners.
The implication for military operations would seem to be that seizure of
WMD items found aboard foreign ships or aircraft may be authorized. The
D O O L I N 3 7
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counterargument is that no interpretation is permitted when the text of a treaty
is clear—and none of the WMD or terrorism conventions authorizes maritime
interdiction.39 Each treaty was the product of negotiation by states, and subse-
quently changed security needs, however compelling, cannot add a right to mar-
itime interdiction that does not exist in its language.
Conventional weapons, explosives, and ballistic missiles are not illegal per se.
It is within the sovereign rights of nations to possess and transfer them, or to
agree not to transfer them. Two initiatives against conventional weapons are the
MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Both are supported by roughly the
same plurality—thirty of the thirty-three signatories for MTCR and WA are
identical.40 Six other nations support either MTCR or WA but not both.41 The
bottom line is that only 17 percent of the UN membership supports MTCR and
WA, and less than 15 percent support both. Neither can be assumed customary;
therefore, MTCR and WA are enforceable only against signatories, absent addi-
tional and specific authority against a nonsignatory.
HOW PSI CAN MASTER THE FACTORS OF SPACE, FORCE, AND TIME
International law provides a framework for operational design. The law empow-
ers every nation that participates in PSI to conduct maritime interdiction opera-
tions (MIO) in its national waters and against its own vessels. Successful PSI
military operations, however, will require unity of effort. The participation of
many countries and their collective capability in command and control will de-
termine what can be seized, where, and by whom. Intelligence services will be re-
quired to detect the production and shipment of potentially small WMD
packages over enormous distances. Intelligence data can justify an “approach
and visit” under one of the six UNCLOS exceptions for illegal activity; in rare
cases, it may also reveal grounds for self-defense actions. The law, for its part, can
fill in gaps when intelligence is incomplete, so long as the facts give reasonable
grounds to suspect certain illegal activities. The link between intelligence and le-
gal authority for maritime interdiction means that PSI nations need to enhance
their awareness about vessels approaching their national waters.
The Factor of Space
PSI participants have the sovereign power to inspect any vessel or aircraft pres-
ent in their territories, territorial seas and airspace, and to a lesser extent, in their
contiguous zones. Making national space less porous to WMD transport is an
enormous operational challenge. For example, the American coastline stretches
ninety-eight thousand miles and includes “3.5 million square miles of ocean
area” (that is, inside twelve nautical miles) and 185 deepwater ports.42 Interna-
tional trade involves at least a hundred thousand registered merchant vessels of a
3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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hundred gross tons or more, flying the flags of two hundred countries.43 Focus on
the world’s largest ports compresses the space problem. Sixteen “superports”
handle 99 percent of the world’s trade volume, and 90 percent of this volume
passes through nine choke points.44
By identifying major sources of weapons of mass destruction, intelligence can
help operational planners prioritize counterproliferation efforts. Table 4 is an
overview of WMD programs and terrorist presence in fourteen countries that
have the most of each. Purchase and theft are presumably easier ways for terrorists
to obtain WMD than developing their own. Large-scale production of weapons
of mass destruction requires substantial facilities, as well as time and expense.
Still, and although large programs are generally detectable by national intelli-
gence networks, they cannot be detected with absolute reliability—as Saddam
Hussein’s WMD programs are a pointed reminder.45 Further, modest quantities
of biological or chemical weapons are fairly easy to produce, and the radioactive
D O O L I N 3 9
Countrya Nuclear Bio CW Missiles Terrorb Remarks
North Korea Y Y Y Y *
BWC, CWC, NPT,
WMD negotiations
Iran Y Y Y Y 1*
BWC, CWC, NPT,
WMD negotiations
China Y Y Y Y BWC, CWC, NPT
Russia Y Y Y Y BWC, CWC, NPT, MTCR
Syria Y Y Y * WMD negotiations
Libya Y Y Y * BWC, WMD negotiations
Pakistan Y Y Y 5 BWC, CWC
India Y Y Y BWC, CWC
Israel Y Y 8 CWC
Vietnam Y Y BWC, CWC, NPT
Sudan Y *
BWC, CWC, NPT,
terror negotiations
Egypt Y 2 BWC, NPT
Yemen Y 1 BWC, CWC, NPT
Cuba Y * BWC, CWC, NPT
TABLE 4
WMD THREAT MATRIX
Bio = biological weapons CW = chemical weapons
Notes:
a. Omitted is Iraq, in the process of disarmament as a consequence of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM; and Afghanistan, whose sponsorship of terrorism was ended
by ENDURING FREEDOM. Six other nations have at least one terrorist group but no WMD: Algeria, Colombia, Lebanon, Philippines, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.
Britain and France, both nuclear powers, are not listed.
b. Number of known terrorist groups that operate in that country. Asterisk means the country was considered a state sponsor of terrorism in National Strat-
egy for Combating Terrorism (2003).
Sources: Kenneth Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, CRS Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, 10 September 2001); and James Fitzsimonds, “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (unpublished paper, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 2000).
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material needed to make a small but lethal “dirty bomb” (radiological dispersal
device or RDD) could be obtained from more than “22,000 machines world-
wide,” located at “hospitals, universities, factories, construction companies and
laboratories.”46 Therefore, table 4 is only the starting point for prioritizing WMD
sources and potential threats.
Increase Participation in PSI. U.S. joint doctrine presumes that maritime inter-
diction operations have both military and political purposes.47 The desired end
state for PSI is elimination of WMD proliferation to the maximum extent possi-
ble. The political objective is to encourage proliferating nations to conform to
PSI; the military objective is interdiction of weapons of mass destruction be-
tween source countries and terrorist organizations. International law, as we have
seen, makes it easier for PSI participants to seize WMD in their own territorial
seas and contiguous zones than on the high seas. PSI operations in national ter-
ritory, water, and airspace enhance the legitimacy of the entire undertaking. The
existence of a superport in a PSI nation accounts for a possible transit point for
WMD shipments; a threat nation’s acceptance of PSI removes a proliferation
source or recipient and adds space where PSI is followed. Compliance expands
cooperation with PSI beyond the situations where international law permits
military interdiction, and it permits assets to be devoted to other threats. Libya’s
renunciation of WMD programs is a recent example.48
Table 5 (which overlays threat data from table 4 with PSI participants,
chokepoints, superports, and merchant ship registration) shows that current
PSI participation produces favorable space-force relationships in NorthCom
and EuCom but poor ones in CentCom and PaCom. Bilateral agreements for
consent boardings, using the Liberia agreement as a model, with three more
countries (the Bahamas, Greece, and Malta) will bring EuCom and NorthCom
ship ratios to 100 percent. EuCom has many PSI partners to track threat nations,
and PSI countries control all three superports in the theater; Russian participa-
tion in PSI would eliminate a WMD source. In CentCom, Egypt stands out, be-
cause that country controls the Suez Canal, one of the choke points. In PaCom,
threat nations outnumber PSI partners, which account for less than a third of
the superports. China is a decisive point in that region; it is a WMD source na-
tion, has a superport, and owns a large merchant fleet. China, however, shares to
some degree the interests of the PSI core nations in economic stability and
nonproliferation.49
Focus on WMD Source Countries. PSI targets a center of gravity for terrorist
groups: their ability to receive weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist groups are
numerous, covert, and mobile. It can be difficult to identify their lines of commu-
nication or predict where they could receive WMD. By contrast, countries have
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fixed seaports, and most countries value their economic and political relation-
ships with the international community. The fact that major WMD sources are
countries, then, is a critical vulnerability for terrorists. Combatant commanders
can, therefore, in their theater security cooperation plans consider WMD source
countries as critical vulnerabilities of terrorists and synchronize military inter-
diction with political, economic, and information instruments.
Stop Drug Money That Buys WMD. Drug trafficking produces “vast sums of
money for international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations.”50
Diminishing drug traffic that funds terrorist groups impairs their ability to pur-
chase or develop WMD. International law makes this connection a critical vulner-
ability—PSI nations may legally conduct interdiction operations on the high seas
against suspected drug traffickers. Counterdrug operations can harm terrorist
networks while observing the principles of legitimacy and restraint.
D O O L I N 4 1
Commander PSI Nations Threat Nations Ratioa Choke Points
Super
Portsb
Ship
Ratioc
CentCom 0
Egypt
*Iran
*Pakistand
Sudan
Yemen
0:5
Strait of Hormuz
Suez Canal
0 of 1 0:0
EuCom
Denmark, Neth., Spain,
France, Norway, (Cy-
prus),f Turkey, Germany,
Poland, U.K., Italy, Portu-
gal, (Liberia)f
*Israel
*Libyae
*Syria
*Russia
11:4
Dardanelles
English Channel
Strait of Gibraltar
3 of 3 5:7
NorthCom U.S., Canada Cuba 2:1 None 5 of 5 1:2
PaCom
Australia, (Marshall Is.),f
Japan, Sing.
*China
*India
* N. Kor.
*Vietnam
3:4
Straits of Malacca
Taiwan Strait
Tsushima Strait
2 of 7g 2:4
SouthCom (Panama)f None 0:0 Panama Canal 1 of 1 1:1
TABLE 5
THE GEOGRAPHY OF PSI
Notes:
* Threat nations, major WMD sources.
a. Compares PSI and threat nations (as given in left columns).
b. Number of “super ports” in PSI nations versus the total number in the commander’s area of responsibility.
c. Number of largest merchant fleets under PSI flags versus the total number in the commander’s area of responsibility. Those PSI countries are: Singapore,
Norway, U.S., Japan, Italy, and Germany. Nations with the largest vessel registries are also grouped by AOR: EuCom—Greece, Malta, Cyprus;
NorthCom—Bahamas; PaCom—China, Marshall Islands; SouthCom—Panama.
d. Pakistan is investigating and has denounced alleged transfers of atomic program information to Iran.
e. Libya has recently renounced its WMD programs, making the ratio even more favorable in EuCom.
f. Bilateral agreement with the United States.
g Taiwanese cooperation in detaining in Kaohsiung Harbor the North Korean vessel Be Gaehung, which was carrying chemical precursors.
Sources: “General Denies Letting Secrets of A-Bomb out of Pakistan,” New York Times, 27 January 2004, p. A6; “Libya: No More Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion,” Newport Daily News, 20–21 December 2003, sec. 1, p. 1; “Ship’s Seizure Sends Signal to North Korea,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 August 2003;
U.S. Transportation Dept.,MARAD 2001:Maritime Administration’s Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Maritime Administration, 2001), p. 41.
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In the peacetime legal framework, operational commanders have discretion
as to how often to approach and visit vessels. A risk-averse option is to approach
and visit only when there is tangible evidence about a particular vessel, such as
intelligence that narcotics were loaded as cargo. A more assertive concept uses
the 1982 UNCLOS standard of “reasonable grounds.”51 The facts that a vessel is
visibly low in the water and is on a possible drug route would permit the infer-
ence that it may be engaged in drug trafficking.
The Factor of Force
Each PSI participant brings forces to counterproliferation, of varying size and
quality. These forces collectively have a critical weakness and a critical strength
in concentrating to detect and intercept a WMD carrier. The weakness is that
they simply cannot be everywhere at once. Thus, it is necessary to achieve infor-
mation superiority and exercise command and control to focus PSI forces and
surveillance assets where they are required. This task is made easier by the fact
that U.S. sea-based forces are routinely positioned ninety-six hours away from
major shipping routes.52
The critical strength PSI forces enjoy is that when a threat is detected, partici-
pants can muster sufficient force to overpower any potential WMD carrier. The
typical scenario is of a warship or one of its small boats approaching an un-
armed or lightly armed vessel. In most cases the ship receives the master’s con-
sent to board and search. Gunfire is usually not required; should a forcible
boarding be necessary, however, the warship can disable the vessel with its own
weapons or send an embarked “visit board search seize team” (VBSST) to take
control of it. The capabilities of a VBSST, of naval or Coast Guard personnel,
would usually be sufficient to deal with an unarmed or lightly armed crew. If
not, Marines or special operations forces could be requested from the combat-
ant commander. Once aboard, a VBSST can face a difficult task if the crew, even
if unresisting, does not actively aid the search. Ships have hundreds of compart-
ments. Voids and tanks can go undetected if welded shut. On board a large con-
tainer ship, the contents of perhaps thousands of sealed containers, each the size
of a truck trailer, are described by lengthy bills of lading, which must be carefully
examined. These realities require proficient and properly equipped VBSST, es-
pecially since WMD contraband may be very small.53
Use NATO Architecture for Large-Scale Exercises with PSI Nations. Thirteen of
the current PSI participants are also NATO members.54 This heavy proportion
of NATO countries yields operational advantages for the Proliferation Security
Initiative—the NATO command structure, rules of engagement (ROE), and in-
formation assurance agreements can (and should) be used for PSI operations.55
In this way valuable time can be saved, and new PSI members incorporated
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more easily. Operations with non-NATO teammates will require the use of stan-
dardization agreements for information assurance—that is, the protection of
NATO-classified material.56 NATO rules of engagement can be “sanitized” to
safeguard them from compromise. The NATO standardization agreement can
also be the basis for memoranda of understanding with appropriate foreign
agencies, to foster the sharing of intelligence on WMD matters throughout the
PSI membership.
Continue Combined Exercises and Deployments. On PSI’s second anniversary,
its leaders boasted that “over 40 countries have participated in fourteen training
exercises.”57 Command and control is critical if PSI participants are to focus sur-
veillance assets and determine where interdiction is required. Mastery of it will
leverage their advantage in force and facilitate unity of effort. The tasks of com-
mand and control, communicating and disseminating, and using intelligence
for large-scale maritime interdiction operations must be exercised in order to
make forces ready for contingencies. Combined exercises and deployments will
allow PSI participants to practice these skills; determine tactics, techniques, and
procedures for the host of operational and legal issues that would arise from ac-
tual WMD seizures; and validate planning for UN-sanctioned actions against
WMD source countries.58
Multinational warships on PSI taskings could be deployed with U.S. strike
groups. Deployment of a foreign warship on a regular basis with a battle group
would enhance its capabilities for PSI operations. A warship from another na-
tion brings that nation’s sovereign power for “same flag” boardings. Many navies
have law enforcement authority in their nations’ contiguous zones and territo-
rial seas, expanding the potential area of operations. Further, such combined de-
ployments would test the integration of command and control in varied
environments and over extended periods.59
When the United States hosts PSI exercises, inclusion of the Coast Guard would
repair a seam between the American sea services. The Coast Guard has law
enforcement authority and is the lead federal agency for interdiction in U.S. terri-
torial seas and contiguous zones; the Navy has more surveillance assets but no law
enforcement authority. Any American response to a shipment of WMD toward
the homeland would likely involve both services. Exercises are needed, therefore,
to test contingency planning for Navy–Coast Guard interdiction of WMD.
Share Intelligence among PSI Participants. The peacetime justifications for in-
terdiction on the high seas, based on the six kinds of illegal activities enumerated
above, highlight the relationship between intelligence and legal authority. If op-
erational commanders have evidence of a vessel’s illegal activity or the threat of
an imminent attack, legal justification for interdiction may be possible.
D O O L I N 4 3
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vp
Monday, April 17, 2006 8:46:18 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
15
Doolin: The Proliferation Security Initiative—Cornerstone of a New Intern
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
Interagency and international resources can improve awareness concerning
WMD movements and the effectiveness of searches. Sharing intelligence among
the armed forces and civilian agencies of PSI countries about WMD shipments
will further promote unity of effort.
Use Interagency Resources. Each combatant commander has an intelligence
team, including interagency professionals, that can tap into the national struc-
ture that monitors WMD activities. “Critical information requirements” to sup-
port PSI operations are different from traditional concentration on an enemy’s
order of battle. Data is needed on merchant vessels, storage capabilities, and
normal operations. Maritime shipping expertise is required to decipher bills of
lading. It may not be possible to add maritime shipping experts to combatant
commanders’ staffs, but liaison with them is essential. American customs in-
spectors and the Coast Guard foreign port liaison officers are other resources for
critical intelligence or training. The Coast Guard has four “maritime safety and
security teams” (MSSTs), of approximately a hundred active-duty and reserve
personnel each, that protect domestic ports in the homeland. One MSST spe-
cialty is WMD detection.60 If maritime agency resources and maritime training
safety and security teams were tapped to train VBSST, improvement in the abil-
ity to detect weapons of mass destruction on board merchant vessels would al-
most certainly result. In such ways, interagency cooperation can bring new
knowledge and state-of-the-art procedures to shipboard searches.
Use International Resources. The State Department is the lead agency for inter-
national law enforcement academies (ILEA), which, with the departments of
Justice and Treasury as partners, have “trained over 8,000 officials from 50 coun-
tries.”61 Alumni of these academies represent a potentially valuable pool of inter-
national talent, on which defense attachés could call for answers about a nation’s
maritime companies and procedures. International law enforcement academy
graduates might assist combatant commanders’ staffs as liaison or interpreters
to increase the effectiveness of shipboard searches.
The Factor of Time
As we have seen, no counterproliferation convention has created the right to in-
terdict the shipment of weapons of mass destruction on the high seas. Under
some circumstances, however, international law permits interdiction of WMD
and conventional weapons in international waters without consent of the flag
nation. With such authority PSI nations would not have to wait until the vessel
entered their contiguous zones and make the interdiction in that narrow area.
There are three possibilities. First, during armed conflicts belligerent war-
ships can “visit” merchant vessels in international waters to search for con-
traband. Second, the Security Council can authorize an arms embargo as a
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“partial interruption of economic relations” against a member state and enforce
it with a “blockade.”62 Finally, and precariously, the inherent right of self-defense
may authorize interdiction. Each of these legal avenues has political require-
ments and risks.
Do Not Invoke the Belligerent Power Universally. The United States does not in
general claim belligerent status in the global war on terrorism to “visit and
search,” but some military operations under that rubric qualify as armed con-
flicts under international law; current examples include operations IRAQI FREE-
DOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Broader belligerent status would require an
enabling resolution or formal declaration of war by the Congress. Aside from
the political issue of mustering domestic support, the legal issue would be whom
or what to declare war against. Traditional practice assumes that one state de-
clares war on another state, putting all on notice that, inter alia, the declaring
state intends to exercise the wartime power of visit and search. This is impracti-
cal against a stateless threat. To cover all flag nations that might be a host for
al-Qa‘ida cargo the United States would have to declare itself in at least a techni-
cal state of belligerence against at least eleven countries that the 9/11 Commis-
sion lists as potential sanctuaries.63 (The commission itself recommended
instead garnering support for PSI.)64 It would be far better policy to reserve the
belligerent right of visit and search to cases of actual armed conflict.
Use Security Council Resolution 1540 to Request Flag-Nation Consent. Resolu-
tions of the Security Council can authorize maritime interdiction. This author-
ity is reactive, not preventive, in that the state must have committed acts
justifying the resolution. Often it is embodied in two resolutions, one for the
embargo and the second for maritime interdiction operations to enforce the
embargo.65 Again, this power has always been exercised against states, making it
legally and politically difficult to obtain specific authority against a country sim-
ply because it is perceived as a WMD threat, and there is no standing resolution
to authorize interdiction at sea to enforce WMD conventions.
However, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 imposes a
duty on all member states to “refrain from providing any form of support to
non-State actors,” including weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems,
such as missiles.66 Its rationale was to correct a “gap” in international law regard-
ing nonstate actors.67
Resolution 1540 received unanimous support, even from countries that had
opposed American preemptive action against Iraq—China, France, Germany,
and Russia. Also significant was the fact that Spain’s support was unaffected by
the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid. Two of the four PSI Principles are
imbedded in Resolution 1540. In language similar to PSI Principle 1, pledging
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interdiction, UNSCR 1540 calls on states to “detect, deter, prevent and combat”
illicit WMD trafficking within their own borders.68 PSI Principle 3 (strengthen
national legal authorities for counterproliferation) becomes a requirement that
states make and enforce domestic laws prohibiting WMD acquisition and pos-
session “for terrorist purposes.”69
Resolution 1540, though it added no maritime interdiction authority, can be
cited as the legal basis to persuade a flag state to cooperate with counter-
proliferation activities. At sea, that means it should “seriously consider provid-
ing consent” for vessel searches if there is a reasonable suspicion that WMD
cargo is aboard.70
Use Article 51 Selectively as a Trump Card. Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter refers to actual “armed attack” as the threshold for national self-defense.
The article is incorporated by reference into numerous security agreements.71 It
cannot be invoked merely to restrict the growth of an opponent’s capabilities,
because actions in self-defense must be consistent with the international princi-
ples of necessity and proportionality. Article 51 may be thought of as a trump
card that can be played only when a threat becomes an imminent attack.
The status in law of maritime interdiction as a measure of “anticipatory”
self-defense has historical roots. On 29 December 1837, the American steam ves-
sel Caroline was burned in U.S. waters by the British, who suspected the ship was
carrying arms to Canadians engaged in rebellion.72 The case is frequently cited
as the basis for the legal elements of anticipatory self-defense (which the British
did not follow regarding Caroline): “(a) its exercise must be in response to actual
or threatened violence, (b) the actual or threatened violence must create an in-
stant and overwhelming necessity to respond, and (c) the self-defense measures
taken must not be excessive or unreasonable in relation to the threat.”73 Scholars
debate whether this doctrine was codified or eradicated by Article 51, and how
much of it still has force.74
Like the rest of the UN Charter, Article 51 was devised to govern affairs be-
tween states, an arena where deterrence can be a useful tool. Article 51 is insur-
ance when deterrence fails, authorizing force in self-defense in response to
attack until the Security Council acts to remedy the matter. The UN Charter
outlaws preventive attacks between states, such as those committed by Nazi Ger-
many and imperial Japan. The Security Council has authorized military inter-
vention on two occasions in response to territorial invasion by one state upon
another, reversing the invasion of South Korea in 1950 and of Kuwait in 1990.
But lack of unanimity among the permanent five members paralyzes the Secu-
rity Council, as evidenced by its inaction following the report by the United
States of the Soviet Union’s shipment of nuclear missiles to Cuba in 1962.75
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The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 illustrates how the combination of resolve,
diplomacy with regional allies, and seapower can interdict weapons of mass de-
struction. Although the Security Council did not act on the American charge
that the Soviets were transporting WMD, the Organ of Consultation of the
American Republics, convened by the Organization of American States, resolved
to ensure that Cuba did not receive them. This resolution, which did not rely
upon Article 51, was the legal basis cited in President John F. Kennedy’s procla-
mation of a defensive quarantine.76 A brief look at the legal reasoning in that
case demonstrates, however, that interdiction of weapons of mass destruction in
international waters is consistent with state obligations under the UN Charter.
The United States, as we have seen, did not invoke Article 51 or the wartime
doctrine of blockade to justify the “quarantine.”77 Rather, it used as its legal basis
the 1947 Rio Pact, which provided for the collective security of the Western
Hemisphere, using the Article 51 standard.78 The United States was obliged to
interdict the Soviet weapons on its own because its report to the Security Coun-
cil was not acted upon. However, the Rio Pact, to which it appealed, incorporates
the Article 51 standard in its own Article 3. Further, President Kennedy’s Procla-
mation 3504 of 23 October declared that interdiction of offensive weapons and
materials, conventional missiles as well as nuclear materials, would be con-
ducted at a “reasonable distance from Cuba” and along “prescribed routes” to
that country.79 Also, the military force employed was proportional to the threat,
in that it was directed against ships carrying weapons to Cuba. The decision rep-
resented the use of minimum force and caused the briefest possible interruption
of other nations’ right to free navigation. It is clear, then—especially in light of
the alternatives, destroying the vessels or attacking deployed weapons systems—
that the quarantine was consistent with U.S. responsibilities under the UN
Charter.80 The interdiction has stood as a permissible measure for over forty
years and is cited today as a valid precedent.81
Other recent examples are available. Israel and Spain have each conducted at
least one interdiction of a conventional weapons shipment in international wa-
ters, apparently without censure. On 3 January 2002, Israel, in Operation
NOAH’S ARK, captured in the Red Sea Karine-A, a Palestinian Authority freighter.
The vessel’s cargo included twelve-mile-range Katyusha rockets, antitank mis-
siles, and high explosives.82 In July 2003, Spain seized a South Korean vessel navi-
gating the high seas toward Senegal to deliver a shipment of conventional
arms.83 Neither action was condemned by the Security Council.
Preemptive action in self-defense lowers military risk, but it does so by raising
political risks, as demonstrated in the U.S. quarantine of Cuba in 1962. There are
numerous other historical examples where the interdiction of vessels at sea
raised political tensions among states or contributed to the outbreak of war.84
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Universal condemnation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism cannot
be used as justification for the violation of another state’s sovereignty. Inter-
cepting aircraft in foreign airspace without the host nation’s express consent
risks adverse international reaction, as Israel learned in 1973 when it intercepted
an aircraft in Lebanese airspace that it believed to carry a Palestinian responsible
for a hijacking; the Security Council condemned Israel’s action in Resolution
337. It was for that reason that the United States did not claim jurisdiction over
the Achille Lauro hijackers whom it captured by diverting an Egyptian aircraft in
Sicilian airspace.85 In 1981, UNSCR 487 condemned an Israeli attack on an Iraqi
reactor.86 The record, then, confirms that while some states have interdicted
weapons shipments on the high seas without sanction, these instances were ex-
ceptions and not the general rule. Therefore, states take a political risk if they do
so; the prudent approach is to use Article 51 sparingly—only when it can be jus-
tified with compelling facts.
National self-defense could be used to justify maritime interdiction if the
facts established that the transport of weapons of mass destruction toward the
coastal nation constituted an imminent threat of armed attack. If the United
States learned, for instance, that WMD was being transported illegally toward
its shores aboard a vessel capable of releasing the payload during transit, the
imminence of armed attack could be inferred. The release of biological or
chemical weapons in a territorial sea would risk damage to vessels and islands
within that territorial sea, as well as parts of an exclusive economic zone (dis-
cussed below) and even the mainland. Detonation of a nuclear device could eas-
ily do damage within the twenty-four-mile radius embracing the territorial sea
and contiguous zone. Interdiction on the high seas would therefore be justified as
both necessary to prevent the attack and proportional to the threat. National self-
defense, as formally defined by the United States, could be invoked under such
circumstances.87
ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO SEIZE WMD ON THE HIGH SEAS
Stopping a vessel at sea means interfering with a fundamental right, that of free-
dom of navigation. Yet this right is not absolute. A coastal state’s interest in law
enforcement can overcome another country’s right to unmolested freedom of
navigation. Contiguous zones are international waters, but they are subject to
the laws of the coastal state in situations constituting “hot pursuit.”88 The bal-
ance of interests twenty-four miles from sovereign territory has been conclu-
sively presumed to be in favor of the coastal nation. There is no distinction
between a point mere yards past the territorial sea and one twenty-four nautical
miles from the baseline, the outer range of the contiguous zone—both are in in-
ternational waters, and the coastal nation has equal power at either.
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Even beyond the contiguous zone, international law gives a coastal nation in-
fluence over foreign vessels, if it has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In its
EEZ, which would extend as far as two hundred nautical miles from its baseline,
the state has jurisdiction over the scientific exploration, economic exploitation,
and environmental management and conservation.89 The legal regime of the
EEZ expresses another balancing of interests, the upshot of which is that the
state may interfere with free navigation far from its coast. The paradox is that in
the EEZ the permissible reasons for interrupting free navigation are of less grav-
ity than in the contiguous zone, though the EEZ is a much larger expanse of sea
and extends farther out. Here it is economic reasons that justify intrusion; those
of law enforcement stop at the twenty-four-mile line.
Yet as we have seen, international law permits some temporary interference
with the right of free navigation well out on the high seas. Warships have a
unique, but limited, right to abridge free navigation by approaching and visiting
vessels anywhere, if the situation justifies the expense and inconvenience for the
owner. In peacetime, the balance heavily favors freedom of navigation. In accor-
dance with Article 110 of the 1982 UNCLOS agreement, warships may impede a
vessel without regard to proximity to the coast only if there is reason to suspect
that it is engaged in one of six categories of illegal activity.90
Each of these six exceptional categories was part of international practice be-
fore codification in the law of the sea. Each expresses a rule for the balancing of
interests between coastal states and a transiting nation’s freedom of navigation.
All six accept the interruption of navigation as a trade-off for enforcement of the
law. Without them, piracy, illegal broadcasting, and trafficking in narcotics or
slavery would have safe havens in the world’s oceans. All nations that respect and
depend upon laws to maintain peace and security benefit from UNCLOS Article
110. One hundred forty-five nations have ratified UNCLOS, while other nations
observe it as a matter of policy.91 There is widespread recognition, then, that the
law enforcement interest of a state can trump the right to freedom of navigation
in some circumstances. Conventions against weapons of mass destruction carry
even wider international support.92
National legislation reaches into international waters. The United Kingdom
prosecutes piracy on the basis of its 1688 antipiracy and illegal-privateering stat-
ute.93 The U.S. Congress has also made law reaching the high seas: “Whoever, on
the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is
afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for
life.”94 National legislation could be passed to interdict WMD and terrorists in
international waters. The state interest in doing so is easily argued; states already
legislate against criminal operations on the high seas—pirates and drug/slave
traders. Where such criminals could harm individuals and small groups,
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terrorists, especially if armed with weapons of mass destruction, threaten much
larger numbers of people. Interdiction on the high seas would clearly aid the en-
forcement of international conventions prohibiting WMD proliferation; failure
to permit interdiction would render the conventions unenforceable.
But the remedy is amendment, not reinterpretation. The UNCLOS exception
categories emerged for specific historical reasons. Many elements of the law of
the sea began as domestic laws, and some had been taken up in treaties prior to
UNCLOS. Specific treaties created duties or granted rights between states on the
high seas. Some of these, over time, became customs, the original documents
forgotten, only to be recodified in later treaties, including the 1982 convention,
which constituted written recognition of norms, uniform rules for their prac-
tice, and notice to other countries. UNCLOS Article 110, then, cannot be read
collectively as a universal endorsement of “approach and visit,” as a single prin-
ciple justifying interruptions of navigation for reasons not enumerated.95
BUILDING A NEW INTERNATIONAL NORM
So San showed that international law and politics can be decisive in the outcome
of maritime interdiction. PSI participants have legal authority to visit and
search vessels in their territories, territorial seas and airspace, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, their contiguous zones. In international waters, warships can visit and
search merchant vessels flying their countries’ flags.
Existing legal authority makes it easier to seize weapons of mass destruction
than other items that would strengthen terrorist groups, such as ballistic missiles
or conventional weapons. Biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons are almost
universally seen as “contraband” and so are arguably subject to seizure, which,
say, ballistic missiles would not be. Resolutions of the Security Council and con-
siderations of belligerence and self-defense can authorize maritime interdiction
in unusual circumstances. But their legal underpinnings make them reactive in
nature and unsuited to a preventive strategy that requires broad international
support. The 1982 UNCLOS convention offers only a patchwork of authority,
exceptions to the right of free navigation. These exceptions, however, grew out
of domestic law and treaties, codified after years of practice in the suppression of
internationally condemned activities into accepted reasons for warships to ap-
proach and visit vessels on the ocean. The Proliferation Security Initiative may
represent the birth of a new such exception, by which, over time, the combina-
tion of law and seapower may close the oceans as a safe haven for proliferators of
weapons of mass destruction.
PSI activities, exercises, and operations will make maritime searches for
WMD more common, the first steps toward a change in international practice.
PSI will slowly change customary international law as more countries accept the
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boarding of vessels on the high seas to search for weapons of mass destruction.
Security Council Resolution 1540 and bilateral agreements will strengthen this
evolution. It might be possible to negotiate a multinational instrument more
quickly than separate bilateral agreements with the over two hundred nations
that register merchant vessels. The supermajority of nations that already sup-
port WMD conventions could amend UNCLOS Article 110 to include traffick-
ing in weapons of mass destruction as a reason for a warship to approach and
visit another state’s vessel in international waters. Perhaps such an amendment
would finally win U.S. Senate ratification, which has been pending since 1994,
for the 1982 UNCLOS agreement as a whole. But even absent such an overarch-
ing instrument in the short term, the proliferation of bilateral agreements grant-
ing the right to approach and visit vessels on the high seas to search for WMD
will steadily increase the number of countries accepting this practice, gradually
establishing it as an international norm and then as creating a perceived duty, a
matter of customary law. Ultimately the effect would be the same: codification in
an amendment to Article 110 to the 1982 law of the sea agreement, making inter-
national recognition of the customary duty explicit and the rules for its practice
uniform. Reasonable suspicion that a vessel is carrying cargo or terrorists associ-
ated with WMD would then be one of the formally enumerated reasons for
interrupting the freedom of navigation on the high seas.
The journey from custom to codification must be intertwined with politics. If
the warning of the So San case has been heard, the nations participating in the
Proliferation Security Initiative will, in one way or the other, obtain “fast-track
authority” for maritime interdiction to enforce counterproliferation on the high
seas, as they do now in coastal waters. If it has not been heard, the international
community may wait for a seaborne WMD attack by terrorists before putting
pen to paper.
NOTE S
1. National Security Strategy for the United States
(Washington, D.C.: White House, September
2002), p. 13.
2. U.S. State Dept., National Strategy for Com-
bating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Febru-
ary 2003) [hereafter NSCT], p. 11, quoting
President Bush.
3. Article 92 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 1982 [hereafter
UNCLOS], codifies the rule about maintain-
ing nationality while under way.
4. UNCLOS, article 110, codifies this authority.
5. The narrative is based upon three news ac-
counts: Carla A. Robbins, “Why U.S. Gave
UN No Role in Plan to Halt Arms Ships,”
Wall Street Journal, 21 October 2003, p. 1;
Jong-Heon Lee, “North Korea: Ship Intercep-
tion ‘Piracy,’” Washington Times, 13 Decem-
ber 2002, dynamic.washtimes.com; and
“Yemen Claims Scuds, Protests to U.S.,”
MSNBC.com, 11 December 2002.
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6. Professor Ruth Wedgewood has opined that
seizure of piracy cargo—or alternatively, Ye-
men’s previous written “pledge” not to import
Scuds—should have justified confiscation.
See Ruth Wedgewood, “A Pirate Is a Pirate,”
Wall Street Journal, 16 December 2003. These
arguments are tempting but easily countered.
There was no evidence So San was involved
with piracy, and the facts leading to its “state-
less” categorization justified boarding and
search only. Treaties or consent at the time of
seizure are the usual standards for impressing
cargo.
7. U.S. State Dept., Fact Sheet on Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Nonproliferation, 9 October 2001),
available at www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/2001/
5340.htm.
8. United Nations Security Council Resolution
[hereafter UNSCR] 1441, 8 November 2002.
9. U.S. State Dept., Statement of Interdiction
Principles (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of
Nonproliferation, 4 September 2003), avail-
able at www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm.
The Group of Eight was established in Octo-
ber 1975 to facilitate economic cooperation
among the developed countries that had par-
ticipated in the Conference on International
Economic Cooperation, held between De-
cember 1975 and 3 June 1977. Its members
are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. See CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
10. The current Unified Command Plan makes
combatant commanders “the single DOD point
of contact within the assigned geographic
AOR [area of responsibility] for countering
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in support of non-proliferation policies,
activities and tasking.” U.S. Defense Dept.,
Unified Command Plan (Washington, D.C.:
30 April 2002), para. 12j.
11. As of the original announcement of PSI, there
were eleven participating nations: Australia,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. By 17 De-
cember 2003, there were five additional coun-
tries: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Singapore,
and Turkey. The five initial meetings of the
core PSI membership were in Madrid, June
2003; Brisbane, July 2003; Paris, September
2003; London, October 2003; and Washing-
ton, D.C., December 2003. U.S. State Dept.,
Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States: Challenge
and Response (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of
Nonproliferation, 2 December 2003), avail-
able at www.state.gov/t/us/rm/26786pf.htm.
12. Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton, tes-
timony before the House International Rela-
tions Committee, 30 March 2004. The
Statement of Interdiction Principles may be
found on the State Department website,
www.state.gov.
13. The remaining member, Singapore, is party
to only BWC, CWC, and NPT. Table 3 de-
scribes each, and table 2 lists the membership.
14. Notably, Singapore offered to host U.S. Ma-
rine antiterrorist patrols in the Straits of
Malacca. “U.S. Plans to Deploy Marines in
Southeast Asian Waterway,” Agence France-
Presse, 5 April 2004.
15. The fourteen countries are listed on table 2.
The three countries that support six of the
major conventions are Bulgaria, Slovakia, and
South Africa. Seven countries support BWC,
CWC, and NPT plus only one of the four
other conventions: Belarus, Brazil, China, Cy-
prus, Iceland, Kazakhstan, and Latvia. New
Zealand supports MTCR, NSG, and WA but
not ZC.
16. Argentina recently deployed a warship with
the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) battle group.
Jack Dorsey, “Navy Developing Plans to De-
ploy, Train Overseas with Foreign Fleets,”
Virginian Pilot, 15 August 2003. Last year,
South Africa received three million dollars in
anticrime and antiterrorism funding and $1.2
million in International Military Education
and Training (IMET). U.S. State Dept., Fact
Sheet: U.S. Assistance to South Africa (Wash-
ington, D.C.: 3 September 2002).
17. The five NATO members are Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, and Lux-
embourg. The seven PfP countries are Aus-
tria, Finland, Ireland, Russia, Sweden,
Switzerland, and Ukraine. Another NATO
member, Iceland, is a signatory to four of the
seven major WMD conventions. Three PfP
members—Finland, Switzerland, and Swe-
den—have pledged funding toward the G-8
global partnership “to commit up to $20
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billion to a global partnership against prolif-
eration” (National Security Strategy, p. 14).
Russia is a beneficiary of this G-8 program.
Fact Sheet: Broadening the Partnership to Stop
the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Washington, D.C.: White House, 2 June 2003).
18. Statement of Interdiction Principles.
19. Ibid., Interdiction Principle 2.
20. Ibid. Interdiction Principle 4 itemizes the
specific actions, which are discussed below.
21. Ibid.
22. UNCLOS, arts. 1, 2, reprinted in Annotated
Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on
the Law of Naval Operations (Newport, R.I.:
Naval War College, International Law Dept.,
1997), para. 1.4.2.
23. Annotated Supplement, para. 2.3.2.1;
UNCLOS, arts. 17–21.
24. Ibid.
25. UNCLOS, arts. 21(1), 21(4); Annotated Sup-
plement, para. 2.3.2.1.
26. UNCLOS, art. 33; Annotated Supplement,
para. 2.4.1.
27. Statement of Interdiction Principles, Inter-
diction Principle 4b.
28. Statement of Interdiction Principles, Inter-
diction Principle 4c.
29. UNCLOS, art. 110 [emphasis supplied]. Arti-
cle 92 establishes the flag nation’s exclusive
jurisdiction, while Article 110 codifies a war-
ship’s right to approach and visit. Text of the
convention, by article, is available at www
.globelaw.com/LawSea/lsconts.htm.
30. The statistics about world shipping registries
use 2001 data. In that year, the following na-
tions, which are now PSI members, registered
the largest merchant fleets: Singapore, Nor-
way, the United States, Japan, Italy, and Ger-
many. U.S. Transportation Dept., MARAD
2001: Maritime Administration’s Annual Re-
port to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Maritime
Administration, 2001), p. 41.
31. U.S. State Dept., “Proliferation Security Ini-
tiative Ship Boarding Agreement Signed with
Liberia,” 12 February 2004, available at www
.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/29338pf.htm.
Agreements identical to the U.S.-Liberia bi-
lateral agreement were signed with Panama
and the Marshall Islands on 12 May and 13
August 2004, respectively. In 2005, the
United States signed agreements with Croatia
(1 June), Cyprus (25 July), and Belize (4 Au-
gust). The six PSI nations with the largest
fleets registered a total of 3,661 vessels; Libe-
ria had the second-largest shipping registry,
with 1,735 vessels. The six PSI nations and Li-
beria accounted for 5,396 registrations of the
worldwide total of 30,293, or 17.8 percent.
Panama flagged 5,120 vessels in 2001, making
it the largest registry. Its participation as a PSI
nation nearly doubles the number of vessels
available for consent boardings and raises the
fraction of the world’s merchant ships acces-
sible to the PSI coalition to 34 percent. No
data was available from MARAD 2001 on the
size of merchant fleets for the other ten PSI
nations.
32. Both prongs are taken from Statement of In-
terdiction Principles, Interdiction Principle 4e.
33. UNCLOS, art. 2; Annotated Supplement,
paras. 1.8, 2.5.1.
34. Convention on International Civil Aviation
(1944) (“The Chicago Convention”); Anno-
tated Supplement, paras. 2.2.2, 2.5.2.1.
35. UNCLOS, art. 2; Chicago Convention, art. 1;
Annotated Supplement, paras. 2.5.1, 2.5.1.1.
36. These exceptions are codified in UNCLOS,
arts. 108 and 110.
37. Of note are the four nonsignatories to NPT:
Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The eleven
nonsignatories to CWC include Iraq, Kazakh-
stan, and North Korea.
38. For discussion of the doctrine, see Michael
Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of Interna-
tional Law,” Sources of International Law, ed.
Martti Koskenniemi (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate,
2000), pp. 251–303.
39. P. K. Menon, The Law of Treaties between
States and International Organizations
(Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1992), p. 73.
The “textual school” of treaty interpretation
is generally accepted; ibid., chap. 7.
40. The thirty nations are: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
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Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
41. Brazil, Iceland, and South Africa signed
MTCR but not WA. Bulgaria, Romania, and
the Slovak Republic signed WA but not
MTCR.
42. Guy Thomas, “A Maritime Traffic-Tracking
System: Cornerstone of Maritime Homeland
Defense,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4
(Autumn 2003), p. 139.
43. Lloyd’s Maritime Information Unit lists a
hundred thousand vessels of that minimum
weight in its “confidential directory,” avail-
able at www.seaway.co.uk. The U.S. Coast
Guard maintains a database of its contacts
with vessels in the Port Information State Ex-
change (PISX), which recognizes over two
hundred jurisdictions for which a vessel may
be flagged; see cgmix.uscg.mil/pisx/pisx/
psix2.
44. Naval War College, U.S. Navy Capabilities
Brief, CD-ROM (Newport, R.I.: Joint Military
Operations Dept., 2002). Five of the sixteen
superports are within the United States, and
three are in Europe. Others are located in
China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, and Taiwan. The choke points
are the Panama Canal, English Channel,
Strait of Gibraltar, Dardanelles, Suez Canal,
Strait of Hormuz, Straits of Malacca, Taiwan
Strait, and Tsushima Strait.
45. “American intelligence officials failed to de-
tect that Iraq’s unconventional weapons pro-
grams were in a state of disarray.” James
Risen, “CIA Lacked Iraq Arms Data, Ex-
Inspector Says,” New York Times, 26 January
2004, p. 1. Underestimating the maturity of
WMD programs is also a risk. In the summer
of 2003, North Korea “surprised” the world
with more advanced ballistic missile and nu-
clear capabilities than it had been previously
believed to possess.
46. Central Intelligence Agency, Terrorist CBRN:
Materials and Effects, 17 December 2003, p. 5,
available at www.cia.gov/cia/reports/terrorist
_cbrn, discusses possible locations of radioac-
tive materials. The figure of twenty-two thou-
sand is from James Fitzsimonds, “Weapons of
Mass Destruction” (unpublished paper, Naval
War College, Newport, R.I., 2000), p. 16.
47. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other
than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, D.C.:
Joint Staff, 16 June 1995), p. III-3.
48. U.S. State Dept., United States Initiatives to
Prevent Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Bu-
reau of Nonproliferation, 24 May 2005), p. 5,
available at www.state.gov.
49. See table 2 and the discussion above.
50. NSCT, p. 22.
51. “Reasonable grounds” is the legal standard
for a visit and search, per article 110 of
UNCLOS.
52. Naval War College, U.S. Navy Capabilities
Brief, CD-ROM (Newport, R.I.: Joint Military
Operations Dept., 2004).
53. Dirty bombs, or “radiological dispersal de-
vices” (RDD), could be as small as a back-
pack, potentially requiring VBSS teams to
conduct a very thorough search (CIA, Terror-
ist CBRN, p. 5). Chemical weapons usually
“require bulk application,” but some biologi-
cal weapons need only “ten grams” to accom-
plish the same effect. Compare Stephen Rose,
“Soft Weapons and Hard Choices” (unpub-
lished research paper, Naval War College,
Newport, R.I., 1989), p. 6, with Guy Roberts,
“The Counterproliferation Self-Help Para-
digm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the
Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Denver Jour-
nal of International Law and Policy 27 (1999),
pp. 493–94 and note 49.
54. As table 1 shows, the thirteen NATO nations
that are also PSI participants are Canada,
Denmark, France (treaty signatory only),
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Po-
land, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
55. The 9/11 Commission specifically recognized
the advantages of using these features of
NATO infrastructure: “The PSI can be more
effective if it uses the intelligence and plan-
ning resources of the NATO alliance.” Na-
tional Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States, 9/11 Commission Report
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 381,
available at www.9-11commission.gov/report/
911Report.pdf.
56. This will simplify information assurance, per-
mitting combatant commanders to use the
NATO standardization agreement “as a basis
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for establishing rules and policies for con-
ducting joint intelligence operations” (Doctrine
for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,
Joint Pub 2-0 [Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff,
9 March 2000], p. vii). “The appropriate U.S.
geographic combatant commander should is-
sue clearly stated guidelines for the release of
classified U.S. information to the MNF
(Multi-National Force)” (Joint Doctrine for
Multinational Operations, Joint Pub 3-16
[Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 5 April 2000],
p. IV-3). The instruction also provides that
guidelines will be “based on existing policy
directives and any applicable approved excep-
tions to the national disclosure policy. These
guidelines should be issued to U.S. partici-
pants only and should be specific enough to
allow implementation down to the tactical
level” (Joint Pub 3-16).
57. U.S. State Dept., The Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI): Second Anniversary (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Bureau of Nonproliferation, 26
May 2005), available at www.state.gov.
58. Actual execution of an MIO embraces several
legal issues: the conduct of the physical
search, diversion of the suspect vessel so that
a proper or safe search may be done, deten-
tion of persons interfering with the search,
and use of force by the VBSS. If the VBSS is
successful in locating WMD or terrorists, ad-
ditional issues arise: What is to be done with
captured WMD materials? Where will per-
sons be detained, and to what authorities will
they be handed over? What sort of prosecu-
tion and due process must be guaranteed for
them? These concerns are beyond the scope
of this article. However, they are all valid and
will arise during operations; exercises in
which policy, doctrine, and procedures can
be developed would be beneficial.
59. As OEF demonstrated, secure communica-
tions for all naval coalition participants are
needed (Phil Wisecup and Tom Williams,
“Enduring Freedom: Making Coalition Naval
Warfare Work,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed-
ings [September 2002], p. 52). In August
2003, USS Enterprise and its battle group de-
ployed with an Argentine vessel (Dorsey,
“Navy Developing Plans to Deploy, Train
Overseas with Foreign Fleets”).
60. U.S. Coast Guard, Fact Card on Maritime
Safety and Security Teams, 23 January 2004,
www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/
Factcards/MSST.htm.
61. U.S. State Dept., Fact Sheet: International Law
Enforcement Academies (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, 7 May 2004), available
at www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/fs/20280pf.htm.
62. UN Charter, arts. 41 and 42, respectively.
63. 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 365–67.
64. “PSI membership should be open to non-
NATO countries. Russia and China should be
encouraged to participate.” Ibid., p. 381.
65. Historic examples of such pairing are:
UNSCR 661, 665 (1990) sanctions against
Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait; UNSCR 713
(1991), p. 757 (1992) weapons against FRY
after fighting began. It is a matter of debate
whether separate UNSCR authority is re-
quired to implement an embargo with mili-
tary force, or whether MIO authorization
should be implied by the embargo authoriza-
tion. See Richard Zeigler, “Ubi Sumus? Quo
Vadimus? Charting the Course of Maritime
Intercept Operations,” Naval Law Review 43
(1996), pp. 27–31, and Jane G. Dalton, “The
Influence of Law on Seapower in Desert
Shield/Desert Storm,” Naval Law Review 41
(1993), pp. 34–45.
66. UNSCR 1540, para. 1, available at
www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04
.html and www.state.gov/p/io/rls/fs/2004/
31963pf.htm.
67. Representatives who spoke in favor of
UNSCR 1540 after the unanimous vote were:
Algeria, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Ger-
many, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, the
Russian Federation, Spain, the United King-
dom, and the United States. Six whose ratio-
nales included closing a “gap” in international
law were: cosponsor France, Pakistan, Chile,
Spain (which used the phrase “legal vac-
uum”), Romania, and the Philippines.
68. UNSCR 1540, para. 3(c).
69. Ibid., quoting paras. 2, 3.
70. Statement of Interdiction Principles, Inter-
diction Principle 4.
71. The North Atlantic Treaty, the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact),
and the Security Treaty between the United
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States and Japan all incorporate Article 51 by
reference.
72. Thomas A. Bailey, Diplomatic History of the
United States, 3rd ed. (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1946), pp. 204–207.
73. Ziegler, “Ubi Sumus? Quo Vadimus?” p. 19.
74. The facts of Caroline and its precedential
value on this point are noted by Roberts,
“The Counterproliferation Self-Help Para-
digm,” p. 483 notes 107–108, and discussed
in Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and
Self-Defense, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 218–19.
75. The United States reported the matter to the
Security Council on 22 October 1962: “The
Council met even before the Organ of Con-
sultation under the Rio Treaty adopted its
resolution of October 23rd and before the
proclamation of defensive quarantine was is-
sued or carried into effect.” Leonard Meeker,
“Defensive Quarantine and the Law,” Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 57 (1963),
pp. 515–24, esp. 522.
76. Ibid.
77. See ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. U.S. President, Proclamation 3504, 23 Octo-
ber 1962, 27 Federal Register 10401, reprinted
in American Journal of International Law 57
(1963), p. 512.
80. Specifically Articles 1(1) and 2(4).
81. Annotated Supplement, art 4.3.2; George P.
Politakis, Modern Aspects of the Laws of Naval
Warfare and Maritime Neutrality (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 151–52;
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense, p.
169. For a contrary view see Wright Quincy,
“The Cuban Quarantine,” American Journal
of International Law 57 (1963), pp. 546–65.
82. “IDF Seizes PA Weapons Ship,” www.us-israel
.org/jsource/Peace/paship.html.
83. Both incidents were reported by Intellibridge
.com, 18 September 2003.
84. Among these examples are the Essex case in
1805, the Chesapeake Affair of 1807, and the
Trent Affair of 1861. See Bailey, Diplomatic
History of the United States, chaps. 8–9, 21.
85. Gerald McGinley, “The Achille Lauro Case,”
Legal Responses to International Terrorism:
U.S. Procedural Aspects, ed. M. Cherif
Bassiouni (Dordrecht, Neth.: Nijhoff, 1988),
pp. 323–25, 351–53.
86. For discussion, see Timothy L. H. McCormack,
Self-Defense in International Law: The Israeli
Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor (New York:
St. Martin’s, 1996).
87. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruc-
tion 3121.01B of 13 June 2005 provides the
standing guidance on self-defense, including
national self-defense, which may be justified
in response to a hostile act or intent toward
the United States. Enclosure A defines “na-
tional self-defense” in paragraphs 5a, 5b, 5f–
5h, and appendix A.
88. UNCLOS, art. 111, codifies the doctrine of
hot pursuit by the coastal nation.
89. This specifically includes artificial islands, in-
stallations and structures with economic pur-
poses, scientific research, and environmental
protection within the EEZ. See UNCLOS,
arts. 56, 58, and 60, also Annotated Supple-
ment, art 2.4.2.
90. The categories are: piracy, slave trade, unau-
thorized broadcasting, without nationality,
deception regarding nationality (when true
nationality is the same as the warship’s), and
illegal narcotics trafficking.
91. See “Chronological List of UNCLOS
Ratifiers,” 16 January 2004, www.un.org/
Depts/los. The United States has not ratified
but follows UNCLOS as a matter of policy.
92. Compare tables 2 and 3 and their accompa-
nying discussion with UNCLOS support by
145 countries.
93. Donald A. Petrie, The Prize Game: Lawful
Looting on the High Seas in the Days of
Fighting Sail (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1999), pp. 68–82.
94. 18 USC 1651. Congress has made the Coast
Guard the lead maritime agency in the en-
forcement of customs laws and created spe-
cific statutory authority for interdiction to
accomplish that mission both “on the high
seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States” (14 USC 20). This separa-
tion by the United States of maritime law en-
forcement from the naval service is unique.
Many states, such as Australia, have made law
enforcement a naval mission. Others, like
Chile, have a law-enforcement specialization
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within the naval service. International law
considers high-seas interdiction for law en-
forcement a task of warships; U.S. Coast
Guard are “warships” under international
law. See UNCLOS, art. 29.
95. Four UNCLOS exception categories are
rooted in the historical struggles against pi-
racy, the slave and opium trades, and illegal
broadcasting in ways that illustrate this pro-
cess. See Suzanne Miers, Britain and the End-
ing of the Slave Trade (New York: Africana,
1975), pp. 3–20, 315–19; “1958 Convention
on the High Seas,” art. 22, reprinted in
Burdick Brittin and Liselotte Watson, Inter-
national Law for Seagoing Officers, 3rd ed.
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1973);
and Annotated Supplement, note 38.
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